This paper studies the characteristics of investment in the slave trade and other long distance trades in France during the eighteenth century. After justifying why the slave trade should be aggregated with other long distance trades for this study, the paper introduces French data. Information is available on a total of 238 ventures from seven French harbours from the 1710s to the 1780s. The paper then focuses on computing the internal rate of return of the portfolio of investment in 65 voyages owned by an investor from Nantes. Using the undiscounted benefit-cost ratio as a proxy, the paper shows that this was typical of French long distance trade investments. These investments compared favourably with domestic alternatives. They were more liquid, shorter and more profitable than private notarized credit without being more risky. They were less risky and had a shorter duration than government bonds, without being less liquid or less profitable. The paper conclude that investment in the slave trade and other long distance trade was preferable to domestic alternatives in France during the eighteenth century. This might be explained by the existence of barriers to entry.
The largest trading power in Europe at the end of the 1780s was France. The total value of its long distance trade -trade with Africa, Asia, America and re-exports to the rest of Europe -was equal to 25 million pounds sterling. The total value of British long distance trade was only 20 million pounds sterling. The growth of French long distance trade from the 1710s had been faster than the growth of English trade 2 . The main support to long distance trade, the plantation system, was larger and more efficient in the French colonies than in the British A companion paper discusses the difficulties of measuring profits for the slave trade and other long distance trades 11 to remember that profits are private returns to capital. They do not include the benefits and costs associated with the whole society or the state 12 ; they should exclude the remuneration of work, knowledge and contacts that is associated with outfitter's revenues. The second one is that the examinations of actual accounts seems to be the safest way to reach a conclusion on profits. The third one is the treatment of time. The undiscounted benefit cost-ratio, the present value and the internal rate of return should not be confused. The second section of this paper comes back on this problem. Finally, it is important to compare the profitability of the slave trade and other long distance trades with alternative investments.
Following these recommendations, this paper extends the microeconomic debate on investment in long distance trade in three directions. First, it introduces French data to the debate. Second, it examines data on all the branches of intercontinental trade, not only the slave trade. Third, it provides a study of all the characteristics of investment in long distance trade, rather than focusing exclusively on profit and risk.
In the first section, the paper underlines the differences between the French and English system of long distance trade, justifies the aggregation of the slave trade with other long distance trade and presents the available evidence. In the second section, the paper examines the internal rate of return of the investment of a single investor, Bertrand de Coeuvre. Using the undiscounted benefit-cost ratio as a proxy, the study of other investments confirms that Bertrand de Coeuvre's results were typical. In the third section, the paper compares profits and other characteristics of slave and long distance trade investments to other available French investments. The fourth section concludes that investments in long distance trade were preferable to alternative domestic investments.
I
The organisation of the French slave trade differed from the English one. Without getting into all the technicalities and diversity of trade operations, a typical French slave trade voyage would proceed in the following manner. First, an outfitter would gather capital from investors under a quasi-equity arrangement by selling ship shares. The outfitter would typically provide only a small fraction of the total outfit cost and be remunerated through a commission. That does not seem to have been the case in England where 'They [ships's husbands, pursers or agents] certainly received no special privileges or commission' 13 . Then, the ship would go to Africa, sell its goods and buy slaves and then go to the West Indies to sell slaves. In contrast to the typical post-1750s English slave trade voyage, the proceeds of the slave sale would be transformed directly into colonial goods. As a result, outfitters and investors in the French slave trade were involved in a range of other long-distance trade activities. All these activities were competing for the same assets:
ships; sailors; trading, outfitting and supply goods; commercial know-how and commercial networks. If the same investors were using the same assets for different investments -without any one being a mandatory complement to any other at the investor level 21 -these investments must have been as profitable. If one of them had been clearly more profitable than the others, it would have attracted all the assets.
At least in the case of France, it is possible to study the profits of all long distance trades together. The slave trade, the West Indies trade and other should have had comparable profitability. The actual profit sources confirm this (cf. 21 On the macro level, these investments were complementary. On the micro level, however, specialisation would have been possible: the mix of activities varied at the port and investor level. 22 Other primary sources might exist. Considering the long interest for the slave trade and other long distance trades, it is probable that an important part of the relevant primary sources have already been found by historians better at looking for them than I am. Having done my own cost-benefit computations, I have made the choice to try and cast a new light on the published evidence rather than hunt for more primary sources. 23 In some cases from Bordeaux and La Rochelle the author has not stated explicitly if the costs and the returns were those of the outfitter or those of the investors. The main difference would be the inclusion or not of commissions. However, accounts were in priority made for submission to investors to report of the success or not of specific ventures. The outfitter's specific remuneration was included in the costs in all the accounts we could examine. As such, we are going to assume that it was the case for all the sources we examine. 
II
Most of the sources identified above give enough information to compute the undiscounted benefit-cost ratio, computed as the ratio between the initial investment and net returns minus one. This ratio is often called the 'rate of profit' or 'profit rate' in past studies on the profitability of the slave trade. We will us the latter expression, between inverted commas, as a convenient shorthand. It does not take into account the timing of returns. Obviously, an investment of 100 livres that yields 125 livres in one year is a much more successful venture that if the same return is achieved only after five years, despite having the same 'profit rate' of 25%. As we have noticed in the preceding section, the returns of trading ventures were spread out over time. For example, less than half of the Bertrand de Coeuvre's investments yielded their full returns in less than 10 years
25
. The 'profit rate' that many studies report is inappropriate for comparing returns from capital invested in trade with returns elsewhere in the economy. To take the chronology of returns into account, we must compute the internal rate of return of these ventures; i.e. the discount rate which equalizes to zero the present value of all outlays and returns during the life an investment. The internal rate of return of the first hypothetical venture presented at the beginning of this paragraph is 25%; the internal rate of return of the second venture is only 4.6%.
The difficulty is that most of the data do not provide us with an exact chronology of return.
As a consequence, it is not possible to compute internal rates of return. Fortunately, part of the data relating to Bertrand de Coeuvre are an exception. We will start from the firm ground of this source and then try to extrapolate the results to the other sources. We can now try to extrapolate the typical internal rate of return in the rest of the data. If the chronological profiles of two investments are similar, the equality of their 'profit rates' entails the equality of their internal rates of return. Hence, although it is not possible to compute the internal rates of return of the other investments, it is possible to use the comparison of their 'profit rate' to Bertrand de Coeuvre's 'profit rate' as a proxy for the comparison of their internal rate of return to Bertrand de Coeuvre's internal rate of return if the chronology of returns is comparable in Bertrand de Coeuvre's portfolio and in the rest of the available data.
Actually, it is probable that Bertrand de Coeuvre experienced longer repayment periods for the same 'profit rate' than was common in the rest of the data. That is because the slave trade and late century investments are over-represented in Bertrand de Coeuvre's voyages. 90% of Bertrand de Coeuvre's voyages started after the Seven Years war -but that was the case of only 50% of the profit observations in the data -and 60% of Bertrand de Coeuvre's voyages were slave trade voyages -against less than 40% of the profit observations in the data. As buying slaves was the main reason why plantation owners in the West Indies had to go into 30 An additional cost is given as well, associated to a particular voyage, but without any date. These expenditures are listed as 'Quote-part des dépenses depuis la mise-hors'. I will assume that this cost was incurred between the outfitting and the departure of the ship. Some outflows lack a date. Here are the choices we have made to give them one. Last investment on the St.-Charles (dossier n°5): 1777 (as this is given elsewhere as the last date of outfitting). Second investment on the St.-Hilaire (dossier n°14): 1766 (as there is one investment in 1765 and one in 1767) ; Last investment on the Le Quartier Morin (dossier n°37): 1778 (as this is given elsewhere as the last date of outfitting). 31 The internal rate of return of Bertrand de Coeuvre's portfolio of 19 slave trade investments was 7.2% and the internal rate of return of his portfolio of 7 West Indies direct trade investments was 5.3%. The rate of return of his three miscellaneous investments was -2.9%. However, the number of observations is too small to make much of these differences.
debt, the slave trade was more prone than other trades to long repayment period. As the financial position of plantation owners declined continuously toward during the eighteenth century 32 , their debts were more and more difficult to recover for French traders. As a consequence, returns from investments took longer to be repatriated latter in the century than earlier. Because of this double over-representation, if we find that the 'profit rate' in the rest of the data is equal to Bertrand de Coeuvre's typical 'profit rate', we can safely conclude that the internal return in the rest of the data is at least equal to and probably higher than Bertrand de Coeuvre's internal rate of return.
The 'profit rate' of Bertrand de Coeuvre's portfolio of 29 investments is 23%. The mean, non-weighted 'profit rate' in the other 209 observations in the data is 31% (standard deviation: 0.98). However, some very high profit observations might play too large a role in determining the mean 'profit rate'. If every rate higher than 200% is replaced by 200% (9 observations), the mean 'profit rate' falls to 23% (standard deviation: 0.53). Bertrand de Coeuvre 'profit rate' was indeed typical of the whole sector. This suggests that the typical internal rate of return in the slave trade and other long distance trade was at least 6%.
Before accepting this conclusion, we must examine four difficulties with the computation of the mean 'profit rates' in the other 209 observations.
The first difficulty is the wide range of 'profit rates' that entails large statistical confidence intervals. The large standard deviation frustrates the research for a statistically significant conclusion. It is not even possible to show that the mean 'profit rate' in long distance trade was different from zero in a statistically significant way. A second difficulty is the potential selection bias in our data. Success might have attracted more curiosity than failure and secondary sources might give an undue place to successful ventures. We have only used private account sources, and hence the curiosity of the eighteenth century public should not affect us. Considering the paucity of the data, it is doubtful that twentieth century researchers were particularly picky; they probably did not select the sources they studied. Their curiosity should not affect us either. The selection bias, then, can only come from what data have actually survived in the archives. When a bankruptcy occurred, account books were taken away from traders' whims to be put into official archives. They had more chances of surviving there than in private archives. In the same way, when something went wrong, investors became less trusting toward the outfitter and demanded to be given more details on what was happening. As a consequence, the evidence on investments that went wrong was repeated in many letters and dispatched to different places. It had more chances of surviving. The selection bias should lead to an underestimation of the usual 'profit rate' rather than an overestimation.
A third difficulty is that the usual 'profit rates' might have varied between locations and types of activities. The data we use comes from numerous French ports and numerous different activities. Table 2 tries to assess if there was a systematic difference in 'profit rates'. Hence, specific port and activity 'profit rate' reveal something about the success and failure of a particular entrepreneur rather than about the general investment opportunities that existed in that port and that activity. The bad results of Rouen are based on a single source, the Dugard company. This company was so unsuccessful it had to be liquidated amidst bickering between its outfitter and its investors. The same company explains the bad results of investments linked with Canada. In Marseilles, Solier and Cie are the only firm we have information on.
They were newcomers in the trade, Swiss protestants attracted there by the high profits that were to be made in the 1780s. They were not successful. Finally, the good results of La Rochelle come from operations made in 1722, before the definite stabilization of the livre tournois; it is possible that part of the these profits were simply due to monetary movements.
This relative uniformity in 'profit rates' is explained by the fact that all the harbours were faced with comparable international and institutional situations. Furthermore, we have already underlined that as the same investors put their money in a large range of trade activities by choice, profits must have been constant in that range.
The fourth difficulty is the possible evolution of the mean 'profit rate' throughout the period. Graph 1 shows that there is nothing to indicate that there was any trend in the evolution of the 'profit rates'. This is reinforced by the computation of time trends. If the data is not truncated, there is positive time trend. If it is truncated at 250%, 200% or 150%, there is a negative time trend. Neither one nor the other is statistically significant.
Graph 1: Evolution of profits through time (209 observations) (log scale) 36
The vertical axis is the 1+'profit rate'
Crosses are 'war' observations, circles are 'peace' observations To the best of our current knowledge, our computation of the mean 'profit rate' is sound. If the mean profit rate was at least equal to Bertrand de Coeuvre's profit rate and if the chronology of returns was typically more advantageous than what Bertrand de Coeuvre 36 Observations are associated with a time frame and the point is at the middle of the time frame. If that time frame includes a year of maritime war, the observation is considered a 'war' one. This graph excludes Bertrand de Coeuvre's investments for which we have computed the internal rate of return because of the difficulty of interpreting them if they are not weighted by the size of investment. Cf. 
III
In this section, we compare investment in the slave trade and other long distance trades with alternative investments in terms of internal rate of return, liquidity, maturity and risk.
We will focus on the comparison with French private and public long-term debt, and we will make only passing comparison with British and Dutch public debt, short-term commercial paper and land investment. This focus does not imply that we believe that the returns of all investments were not linked to one another; we are simply trying to compare like with like. The creation of short-term commercial paper was a by-product of commercial activity. Only active capitalists, entrepreneurs, would have the regular opportunity to invest capital in commercial paper. Land was both a conspicuous consumption good and an investment good. As such, it offered sources of utility that long distance trade investment did not offer. The study of British and Dutch public debt would be more justified; but -unlike the Dutch -French investors did not contribute to the financing of foreign country's debt. That suggests that it was less attractive than French public debt.
We first look at the internal rate of return on investment in long distance trade. In the absolute, 6% does not seem like a large number: it is lower than the numbers presented in the debate on British slave trade profits -but none of them are really comparable internal rates of
return. Yet, as we have seen, it is a conservative estimate. It can only be interpreted in comparison with alternative investments.
-The maximum legal rate of interest, had been fixed at 5% in 1665. It was the same in England. In France, it did not change until the Revolution
38
.
37 This is a nominal internal rate of return. We do not know enough about the evolution of the whole range of prices in France during the 18 th century to compute a meaningful real rate of return. However, it is also mainly a silver internal rate of return, as the silver value of the livre tournois was stable from 1726 to the 1790s. I have assumed that the post-1792 accounts we have were in metallic livre tournois, and I have not taken into account the devaluation of the assignats. 38 Postel-Vinay, La terre et l'argent, p. 86.
-Because of legal problems linked to the notion of usury, there were only two investment instruments in the traditional notarized credit: obligations and rentes. Obligations were zero-coupon bonds. Only the date and the capital to be repaid were ever specified in the contract; it is not possible to compute their internal rates of return. For that reason, we cannot use them in this study. Rentes were perpetual bonds paying a constant interest. Their internal rate of return was equal to their interest rate. The capital and the interest paid were specified in the contract. In Paris, 'around 1750, the legal rate [5%] had imposed itself to a great extent'
39
. In rural markets, the interest rate charged also converged toward 5% . This reflected higher chances of bankruptcy on these bonds. To sum up, the internal rate of return of long distance trade was comparable to that of the most secured French state bonds. It was between 33 % and 70 % higher than the internal rate of return of a land portfolio, and 20% higher than the internal rate of return of private rentes.
It was also higher than the most secure foreign public and private bonds.
Internal rate of return is only one aspect of the attractiveness of an investment. Liquidity, maturity and risk have also to be taken into account. Modern tools of investment assessment, even thought not used by eighteenth century investors 50 allow us to debate objectively notions that investors understood and took into account: liquidity, maturity and risk. We will focus on comparing investment in long distance trade with investment in French state bonds or French private rentes.
Liquidity measures how easy it was for investors to change the utilisation of their capital.
In finance, it is a quantitative measure that seeks to approximate the slope of demand and supply curve of an asset. This is not possible to estimate in our case, as we do not have enough information on the quantities bought and sold on the market. We can only examine a necessary condition for liquidity: was it legally and practically possible to trade different investments?
Ship shares could be sold and bought without legal difficulties, sometimes even at auctions. Only ship shares could be sold, not the future stream of income from past investment on the ship. Meyer and Carrière suggest all the same that this flexibility both delayed (by a process of 'crowding out') and prepared the development of modern-style 47 Velde and Weir, 'Financial market', p. 19. 48 . Furthermore, even when he kept investing in a ship, the extent on his share changed between voyages in five cases. That suggests the existence of some liquidity for long distance trade investment.
The liquidity of private debt liquidity was lower. Even if -in some regions -it was formally possible to sell notarized long-term instruments of credits formal costs and transaction costs were very high on these markets. The buyer of a rente had to be convinced that the debtor was trustful and required explanation of the particular clauses of each contract.
Private information was difficult to transfer. As a result, there was no active secondary market of long-term private credit. 51 Meyer, Armement nantais, pp. Négociants marseillais, Average undiscounted benefit-cost ratio per investment: 7%; average undiscounted benefit-cost ratio per voyage: 19%; average undiscounted benefit-cost ratio per investment, weighted by the cost of the investment: 23%. 53 The buyers were probably the outfitters themselves, who had the choice either to use their own capital to finance their future venture, to find other investors, or to sell the ship itself. they were attached to were specified.
The incomplete information we have suggest that there were no more obstacles to the exchange of trade investment than to the exchange of state debt. Trade investment was certainly more liquid than private debt.
Maturity is another important aspect of an asset. To some extent, investing in short term investment can mitigate liquidity problems. It is less critical to be able to sell an asset if its maturity is only 3 years than if it is 15 years. Similarly, short rotation of capital make it possible to act quickly on new information.
The average maturity of obligations was 4.2 years in 1780s Paris
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. Rentes, at least in Paris, had no ex-ante maturity, as it was never possible for the lender to ask for repayment. were repaid between 52 to 78 years after the lending. Other categories of borrower were not more rapid at repaying the money they had borrowed That is equal to the Macaulay duration of a hypothetical 6 year 6% rente, a 5.2 year obligation -whatever its internal rate of return. A 15 year rente would have to pay 23% to have a duration of 5.2 years. Hence, investment in long distance trade had a much shorter duration than the domestic alternatives.
The high internal rate of return of long distance trade investment cannot be explained as a compensation for lower liquidity or longer maturity. The obvious candidate is extra risk. In examining this hypothesis, it is important to remember that there are two types of risks.
'Private' risk is associated with each individual investment and uncorrelated with outcome of other investments whereas 'market' risk is associated with the whole sector. If private risk is high and market risk is low -high variance but low covariance -it is possible to protect against risk by diversifying. As a result, the standard investment theory predicts that the risk 60 Where that gentleman lived, in Dauphiné, it was possible to buy bonds giving both a repayment date and an interest rate. But the repayment dates were not enforced. Cf. The 'present value' of cash flows is simply their value discounted by an interest rate r. Hence, the computation of a duration implies using a reference interest rate. This is difficult to find in eighteenth century France. However, one can use the internal rate of return of an investment to measure its duration; in this case the duration is called a Macaulay duration.
premium associated with an investment is linked to its covariance with other similar investments 63 . In a sector where diversification is possible, the idea that variance of outcome of different individual investments is a good measure of the existing risk in the market is wrong.
Because of navigational and commercial hazards, long distance trade has often been viewed as a lottery-like business. Even if navigational hazards could be insured against, commercial uncertainty in Africa, the West Indies and Europe could not. As a result, the profitability of individual voyages varied widely. The very high standard deviation of the 'profit rates' in our data in the preceding section and in Graph 1 and the distribution of the internal rates of return in the Bertrand de Coeuvre's portfolio, as illustrated in Graph 2 confirm this. The practice of dividing investment into shares testifies to the diversification efforts of investors. Bertrand de Coeuvre's strategy of diversification , as it is shown in Graph 3, confirms this effort.
Graph 2: Dispersion of internal rates of return in Bertrand de
on the prosperity of traders 71 . To explore this issue, it is useful to distinguish between the effects of wars on existing investment and their effects on potential new investments.
What was the effect of war on existing capital? Some ships 72 were captured, but that was largely covered by insurances. Ships were left in ports. But ships represented a small share of capital. Commercial credit extended to the West Indies to help the sale of slaves or European products was much more important. The real effect of wars was that it was more difficult for planters to repay their debts as trade was interrupted. That could be mitigated when wars were forecasted, as it was possible to try to recover as much capital as possible during the pre-war boom in activity and to use short maturity investments to avoid getting too much capital immobilized in the first place. . Insurance was more difficult as premiums increased and rationing set in 78 . However, post-war periods were the occasion for speculative booms as traders tried to benefit from shortages in newly re-opened markets The available data on long distance trade corroborates these theoretical arguments on the modest effect of war. More specifically, two pieces of evidence that show that there was no systematic negative relationship between wars and profits. The first one is the fact that there is no systematic relationship between the mean internal rate of return of Bertrand's investments and wars, as Graph 5 shows. The second piece of evidence is the fact that the study of the other 209 observations of 'profit' (cf. graph 1) leads to the surprising conclusion that mean 'war' profits (as defined in the footnote of graph 1) were higher than mean 'peace' profits 80 1 7 6 3 1 7 6 4 1 7 6 5 1 7 6 6 1 7 6 7 1 7 6 8 1 7 6 9 1 7 7 0 1 7 7 1 1 7 7 2 1 7 7 3 1 7 7 4 1 7 7 5 1 7 7 6 1 7 7 7 1 7 7 8 1 7 7 9 1 7 8 0 1 7 8 1 1 7 8 2 1 7 8 3 1 7 8 4 1 7 8 5 1 7 8 6 1 7 8 7 1 7 8 8 1 7 8 9 1 7 9 0 1 7 9 1 1 7 9 2
War changed the way trade investments were conducted, but it did not shut down all opportunities for profitable operations. Furthermore, thanks to the short duration and high liquidity of long distance trade investments, it was possible to remove one's capital to domestic ventures during wars. As such, war did not massively undermine the profits of long distance trade investments. It represented only a limited market risk on long distance trade investments. As a result, a diversified long distance trade portfolio was less risky than a government bond portfolio. The risk associated with a diversified long distance trade portfolio was similar to the risk associated with a private lending portfolio. . In Bordeaux, traders 'were keen to deal within a circle of close friends, preferably parents, and were reluctant to deal with speculators from different towns'
102
. The entry ticket for would-be investors seems to have been to become traders, or get a trader in their close circle 103 . Studying the exact workings of the exclusion and integration mechanisms would help us understand how a line of investment could stay more profitable than the alternatives over such a long period.
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